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ABSTRACT
The  impact  of  government  intervention  on  the behavior  of  a country's  import
market  is investigated  by  focusing  on  the departure  this  intervention
induces  between  excess  and  import  demand  functions.  A formal  model  of
government  behavior  is  posited  where  government  preferences  are  embodied  in
a country's  import  demand  function.  This  function  is  related  to  its
corresponding  excess demand  function  through  the domestic  price  to  border
price transmission  elasticity.  A pooled  cross  section  data  on  72  countries
is used  to  estimate  these  functions  for  wheat  and  rice.  The  results
suggest  that  import  demand  elasticities  are  larger  than  their  corresponding
excess  demand  elasticities  and  that  price transmission  elasticities are
less  than  unity.  Differences  in elasticities  over  time,  regions  and  levels
of  nominal  protection  are  also  reported.
Key  Words:  Import  elasticities, government  intervention,
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I.  Introduction
This  paper  addresses  the  issue  of  the  impact  of  government
intervention  on  a country's  import  market  for  rice and  wheat.  Price  policy
and  the  responsiveness  of  countrys'  imports  to  changes  in border  prices
have  a long  tradition  in the  literature.  Illustrations  are  the work  of  D.
Gale Johnson  (1975)  on  the  effect  of  country's  price  policy  and
international  price stability,  the  effects  of  domestic  price policy  on
excess  demand  for  agricultural  imports  (Abbott  1979)  and  more  recently,
Sarris  and  Freebairn's  (1983) article  on  how  the  interaction  of  national
policies  can  lead  to  a lowering  and  instability  of  both  international  and
domestic  prices.  However,  the  literature on  the estimation  of  import
demand  elasticities for  agricultural  commodities  has  invariably  employed
the assumption  that  parameters  underlying  import demand  elasticities  are
unaffected  by  government  intervention.
Under  this  formulation  (Tweeten  (1967,  84),  Johnson  (1977)  and
others),  the  direct  import  elasticity  (Exnj)V  is the  sum  of  direct  domestic
demand  (E0 oj) and  supply  (Esuj)  elasticities  weighted  by  import  shares
(IoDi  QDoi  /QIIJ  and  Isi  = Qsij/Qiij).  However,  when
domestic  and  border  prices differ  it is easily shown  that  import  elasticity
must  be  further  weighted  by  the  price  transmission elasticity  (Epij).  In
this  case,  the direct  import  elasticity  of  demand  can  be  expressed  as:
(1.0)  Erij  =  (EDi  ' I oi  - Esi  '  Isij)Epij
where  (Eou,  * Ioij  - Esj  Isij)  is the  direct  excess  demand  elasticity.
The  approach  employed  by  Tweeten  (1967,  84),  Johnson  (1977)  and  others to-2-
obtain  import  demand  elasticities does  not  take account  of  government
interventions.  This fact  was  noted  by Bredahl,  Meyers .and Collins  (1977)
where  they  argue:
"In  cases  where governments insulate  internal
production  and  consumption  from world  markets,  the
Ep  ...  [price  transmission elasticity]  ...  will  be
at  or  near  zero."  (1977, p. 583
However,  they  do  not  incorporate a theory  of  government  behavior.  Rather,
somewhat  like  a dummy variable  approach,  they posit  a system  where the
import  elasticity  is  zero  or  near  zero  if governments  intervene  and
otherwise  the  free trade elasticity  prevails.
Estimates  of  the  direct  import  and  excess  demand  elasticities  can
differ  for  reasons  other  than  government  intervention  in foreign  trade
markets.  It can  be  easily shown  that  divergence  in elasticity estimates
can  occur  when  the  domestically produced  commodity  (e.g.,  wheat)  is  not
identical  to  the  imported  commodity  because  of  differences  in variety,
moisture  content,  impurities  and  other  attributes, and  when  domestic  prices
are reported  for  a different  level  in  the  market  channel  than  border
prices.  These subtle differences  are  often  empirically  difficult  to  take
into  account.  Price  data  often  are  not  adjusted  for  commodity  attributes
nor  is  it often  possible  to  adjust  reported  prices to  account  for  the
difference  in transport  and  handling  costs  between  domestic  wholesale  and
port  warehouse  facilities.
While  these differences surely  exist,  it is  also  clear  (4, 5, 21)  that
governments  intervene  in their  foreign  trade markets  for  agricultural
commodities.  A  recent  study  (13)  found  that  19  of  the  21  developing
countries  studied  exercised  direct  control  on  imports  and/or  exports of-3-
cereals  either  through  a government  export-import  monopoly,  import
licenses,  export  tax  or  quotas.  In economies  with  government  intervention,
it is not  necessarily  the domestic  forces  of  supply  and  demand  that  are
reflected  in the country's  foreign  trade behavior.  If governments
intervene to  attain  specific  economic  objectives,  the  excess  demand
elasticity  can  depart  from the  import  demand  elasticity.
In addressing  this  issue,  two  contributions  are  made.  The  first
consists  of  the use  of  a formal  model  of  endogenous  government  behavior.
It is posited  that  governments  intervene  in their  trade  sectors
purposefully  by  choosing  levels  of  policy  instruments to  impact  upon
consumer  and  producer  welfare  and  the  treasury.3  Hence,  this  approach
departs  from  the  traditional  excess  demand  model.
The  second  contribution  involves  the  use  of  pooled  cross-section  time
series  data  on  72  countries  to  estimate  import  demand  and  price
transmission  elasticities  for  wheat  and  rice. 4  And  then,  by construction,
to  derive  their  corresponding excess  demand  elasticities.  Overall,  the
results  suggest  that  estimates  of  import  demand  elasticities  under
government  intervention  are  smaller  in absolute value  than  the elasticities
that  would  prevail  if only  the domestic  forces  of  supply  and  demand
prevailed  in country's  import  demand  for  these commodities.
The  paper  flows  as  follows.  The government  intervention  model  is
developed  in the  next  section,  followed  by  the  empirical  model  and  a
discussion  of  the results.  Then,  the  import  demand,  excess  demand  and
price  transmission  elasticities are  presented  for  3 five-year  intervals
over  the  period  1967-80,  on  a grouped  country  basis  and  by  the  level  of
nominal  protection.-4-
II.  THE GOVERNMENT  INTERVENTION  MODEL
Within  a partial  equilibrium context,  a government's  motivation  for
intervening  in a particular  market  is  specified as  a function  of  only two
arguments:  (1)  the  area under  the  excess  demand  function  (A),  representing
the  tradeoff  of  consumer  and  producer  welfare  and  (2) the  net  revenue
position  of  the government  (NR)  via  import marketing.  Let  us  assume
further  that  the government  exercises,  through  whatever  mechanism, direct
control  over  net  trade  (Qr). 5  This  criterion  function  (U)  can  be  written
as  follows:
(2.0)  U =  U(A,  NR;  r(z))
where  r(z)  denotes  the  parameters  r  of  U which  are  determined  by  unknown
political  variables.  The  function  U(')  is  assumed  to  be  a concave,
monotonically increasing  function  in both A and  NR.  Here we  posit  that  the
government  chooses  the  level  of  its  policy  instrument,  net  trade, as
thought  it sought  to  optimize  (2.0).  Implicitly,  the  government  is  assumed
to  know the underlying  supply  and  demand  relationships embodied  in A.
Assuming  no  stock  holdings and  market  clearance  at  a single  price,  the
quantity  imported  (Qx)  equals  excess  demand  (QE),  i.e.,
(2.1)  Q9 =  QE  Qo(Pd)  - QS(Pd)
where domestic  demand  QD  and  supply Q. are expressed  as  a function  of
domestic  price  Pd.  Income  and  all  other  prices,  in the  sense  of  partial
equilibrium,  are  treated  as  parameters.  Hence  the arguments  of  (2.0)  are
defined  as:
0
(2.2)  A =  - PdQi  +  S  Pd(QI)dQI
0)
(2.3)  NR  =  PdQI  - PwQi-5-
where  Pw  is the border  price  and  Pd(Qx)  is  the  price  inverse  excess  demand
function.  The  government's problem  is  to  choose  Qi  to  maximize U.  Suppose
the  ratio  of  marginal  weights  (aU/aA)/(AU/MNA)  is  unity.  The  first  order
necessary  and  sufficient  conditions  characterizing a maximum to  (2.0) in
this  case  is:
(2.4)  U/9aQ  =  Pd  - Pw  =  0.
Thus,  when  the  ratio  of  the  marginal  weights  is  unity,  net  trade  levels  are
chosen  which  equate the  domestic  and  the  border  price.  In this  case,  the
government  may  be  said  to  be  unbiased.  Hence,  our  model  does  not,  by
construction,  prevent  a free  trade  solution.
Now  suppose  that  the  ratio  of  marginal  utility  weights  is  different
from  unity  so  that  the  government  has  a biased  preference.  Letting a =
aU/aA  and  X =  aU/8NR,  the  first  order  condition  yields:
(2.5)  Pd  - Pw  =  ((a-X)/X) (aPd/aQI)QI.
Thus  if at  the  optimal  choice Qi*  the  marginal  weight  a is greater  than
the  marginal  weight X, Pd  is less  than  P.,  while the  converse  is  true if a
is  less  than  X.
Assuming  linear  functions,  the  import  and  excess  demand  functions
appear  in (figure 1).'  The  line  a*/b*,a*  denotes  the  excess demand
function.  This  function  is  identical  to  the  import  demand  function  when  the
weights a, X are  equal.  In this  case,  domestic  and  border  prices  are  equal
and  quantity  Qz  is  imported.  Note  that  a change  in bias  (X  =/= a)
implies  a departure  (rotation)  of  the  import  demand  function  from  the
excess  demand  function  and  a departure  of  domestic  price  (Pd)  from  the
border  price  (P.). 7Figure 1
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It follows  from  the  implicit  function  theorem  that  the government's
decision  rule  (i.e.,  the  import  demand  function)  can  be  obtained  by  solving
(2.5)  for  QB.  Let
(3.0)  Qo =  Qx(P  ; r(z)).
denote  this  result.  The  inverse  excess  demand  function  is  derived  from
(2.1)  and  denoted  as:
(3.1)  Pd  =  Pd(QE).
The  price  transmission  equation  is  obtained  by substituting  (3.0)  into
(2.5).  Denote  this result by
(3.2)  Pd  =  Pd(P.;  r(z)).
Equation  (3.1)  is  not  dependent  on  government  preferences.  These  equations
are  not  independent;  knowledge  of  any  two permits  the  derivation  of  the
other.
A two  commodity  model  which,  for  our  purposes here,  does  not
distinguish  among  producers  or  among  consumers  of  the  two  commodities  but
does  distinguish  between  producers  and  consumers  amounts  to  a slight
generalization  of  the previous model.  In this  case,  the  government's
criterion  function  corresponding  to  (2.0)  can  be  expressed  as
(2.0')  U =  U(A  ,  NRc;  r(z)).
The  market  clearing,  "consumer"  surplus  and  government  expenditure
equations  are:
(2.1')  Qi  =  QEi  QDi(Pdr,Pdw )  - Qsi(Pdr,Pd)
qi
(2.2')  Ac  =  i  (-PdiQxi  +  J  Pdi(QIrQiw)dPdi)
and-8-
(2.3')  NR.  - EI(PdiQgi  - P.iw9i),
where  the  index  i  =  r,w  denotes  rice and  wheat respectively.  Conditions
(2.4)  to  (2.6)  remain  unchanged  for  each  commodity.  The  import  demand
functions
(3.0')  Q.1   =  Q1 (P,,  ,Pw,;  r(z)),
follow from the  implicit function  theorem  where P.~ and  P..  denote the
border  price for  rice and  wheat  respectively.  The  inverse  excess demand
functions
(3.1')  Pda  =  Pdi(QE,QE.)
and  the price  transmission  equations
(3.2')  PdI  =  Pdi(Pw  ,  P, .;  r(z))
are  derived  in a manner  analogous  to  (3.1)  and  (3.2).
The  derivation of  the  import  and  excess  demand  and  the  price
transmission elasticities  for  rice  and  wheat  along  the  lines  of  (1.0)  can
be  simply  stated  as:
(4.0)  (aQzi/aPwiPwi/Qz  =
E(aPdi/•gE  ) (Qg,/Pdi)3-  (aPdi/Pw ) (Pw,/Pdt)
where it is  easily  shown  that  the  right-hand  term in  brackets  is  equivalent
to  the  first  right  hand  term in (1.0).  If  the  price transmission
elasticity  is  unity, than  the  import  and  excess demand  elasticities are
equal.  In the case  of  linear demand  and  supply  (see  footnote  6),  at  Q11',
X less  than  (greater than)  a implies  a transmission elasticity  less  than
(greater than)  unity,  and  hence, a relative preference  for  this  period's
consumers.  Contrary to  the  univariate  linear model,  equal  direct  excess
and  import demand  elasticities do  not  imply unbiasedness.  Biasedness  is
provided  by  border  relative  to  domestic  prices  as  (2.5)  suggests.-9-
III.  EMPIRICAL MODEL
The  model  developed  could  be  applied  to  a single  country  during  a
period  over  which  the parameters  r(z)  of  (2.0)  are constant.  However,  in
general,  we  would  not  expect  these  parameters to  be  constant  across
countries  or  through  time.  The  empirical  model  must  be  specified  to  take
into  account  this problem  of  parameter  non-constancy and  the  fact  that  we
estimate the model  using  pooled  cross-section  time series data  for 72
countries  over  14  years.  The  empirical  model  chosen  to  approximate  the
import  demand  (3.0')  and  price transmission  elasticities  (3.2')  is
(E3.0)
a,,  ijt  a,  ijt  ai k
Qz,ijt  =  ao,tjt(Pwr,  Jt)  (Pw.,jt)  Jnk(PkJt)  Eflt
and
Cuit
(E3.2)  Pd,ijt  =  Co,  (Pw,,tj  )  vijt
respectively,  for  rice  and  wheat  where the  indices  i  =  r (rice),  w (wheat),
k is  the  indice  for  other  variables,  j is  the  country  index  and  t is  time.
The  exponential  terms  are  coefficients  and  Eijt  and  vijt  are
disturbance terms.  The explanatory  variables  are  the  jth  country's  border
price  for  rice  (P.,,t),  wheat  (Pw.,t),  feedgrains  (Pfjt),  oilseeds
(Pojt),  petroleum  (Ppjt),  and  per  capita total  exports  of  goods  and
services  (P.jt).  Properties of  the  coefficients,  disturbance  terms  and
exogenous  variables  are  discussed  subsequently.  Only  two  of  the  three
equations  (3.0' - 3.3')  need  to  be estimated.  Hence,  we  have  chosen the
import  demand  and  the price  transmission  equations;  we  omit  the  excess-10-
demand  equations  (3.1')  and estimate their  direct  price elasticities  as a
residual  from the other  two  directly estimated  elasticities.
Variables  appearing in  the  applied  welfare  measure  Ac,  equation
(2.2'),  and in  the government's  treasury position  (2.3'),  also  appear  in
the  import  demand  function  (3.0').  If  feed  grains  and  oilseeds  are
complements or  substitutes in consumption  and/or  production  and  if they  are
tradeable  commodities  in  the  countries  under consideration, then  even in
the  presence  of  intervention,  the  domestic  prices of  these  commodities
should  be  correlated  with their  border  market  counterparts.  This  is  the
rational  for  their  appearance as  explanatory variables  in (E3.0).  Excess
demand  is  also a function  of  income.  However,  in the  case  of  an  import
demand  function  and  government  intervention,  one  would  expect  the
availability  of  foreign  exchange,  which  we  measure  by  total  exports  per
capita  (P.,jt),  to  be  correlated with  disposable income and  to provide  the
equivalent  of  an  income  constraint  for  import  demand  through  the
government's  treasury position,  equation  (2.3').  Petroleum  price  was also
chosen  because  of  its  relatively  large  share of  import  expenditures  in many
countries.
Recall  that  government  choices  may  also  be  influenced  by  political
forces  such  as  those mentioned  by  Bates  (1980)  and  denoted  by  (z)  in
(2.0').  These  forces  are  complex  and  difficult to  quantify;  in some
countries  they  may vary  over  a ten  year  period,  in others  they may remain
fairly  unchanged.  Moreover, many  of  the political  forces  discussed by
Bates  and  others which  influence government  choices  are  in turn  related  to,
and  affected by,  the  structure and  economic  situation  of  a particular
country.  In general,  our  estimates  will  reflect  an  interaction  of  these-11-
factors.  Nonetheless,  it should  be possible  to  identify  variables  which
will  be  associated  with  differences  in these  parameters across  countries
and  time.
While  it is  beyond  the  scope  of  this  study  to  model  political
behavior,  it is  nevertheless  important  to  identify  explanatory variables,
within  the  context  of  this model  and  data constraints,  that  account  for
country differences.  These variables  serve  as  indices  of  structural
economic  differences  among  countries  while  at  the  same  time,  they should  be
associated  with  factors  influencing  government  choices.
Three factors  are  chosen  to  reflect  country differences  in the
coefficients  of  the first  three components  of  the  RHS of  equations  (E3.0):
(E3.3)  a ,j,it  =  boit.  +  b02,.PCIJt
ar,,it  =  bii,i  +  b12,iERjt  +  b 13, 1NCRAijt  +  b14,iPCijt
aw,ijt  =  b21i,  +  b22,iERjt  +  bi2,iNCRAijt  +  b24,iPCijt
where  (b)  are  coefficients  and  the  jth  country's  explanatory  variables  are
the real  exchange rate  (ER),  the relative  trade  share  (NRCA)  and  the  food
production  to  consumption  self-sufficiency  ratio  (PC).  The  exchange rate
is  chosen  to  reflect  the policy  environment.  Inward  looking  countries
(Belassa, 1981)  are often  characterized  by  over  valued  real  exchange  rates
relative  to  their  major  trading  partners.  The  trade  share  (NRCA))  provides
a measure  of  how  important  a commodity  is  to  a country's  total  agricultural
trade  relative to  other  countries.  This  variable should  be  a proxy  for  the
importance of  a commodity  (rice  and  wheat)  in trade  and  for  the openness  of
the  agriculture sector  to  world  markets  relative  to  other  countries.
Finally,  the ratio  of  food  production  to consumption  (PC)  is  included  to
measure  a country's  relative  dependence  on  food  imports.-12-
In  the  case of  the price  transmission  equation,  these same variables
are used  to capture  changes in  parameters across countries  and  time,  thus:
c,~t  =  b: 3s,  + bS2,3ERJt  +  b3 3 ,iNCRAijt  + b43,iPCijt
Our  approach  is  to  employ  the  small  country assumption,  namely,  that
the  level  of  imports  for  the  j
t h  country  in the  t
th  year  has a negligible
affect  on  world  prices.  While this  assumption  is  reasonable for  most
countries in the sample,  it is  almost  surely  violated  for  others.  To  treat
the problem otherwise,  is  to  significantly complicate  the  fitting  of  the
model  to  available  data.
The  conceptual  framework assumes  that  governments choose the  level  of
net  imports  Q9 in  period  t-l,  so  that  these quantities  actually  enter  the
market  during  period t.  It is  further  assumed  that  the  government has
perfect  knowledge of  the supply  and  demand  conditions  prevailing  in the
economy.  In reality,  this  is not  likely  to  be  the  case.  Instead,
governments probably  form  expectations  of  next  periods  demand  and  supply
conditions.  To  incorporate  an  expectation  formation  mechanism  for  each
country  in the sample  will  quickly  exhaust  the  degrees  of  freedom of  the  14
year  time  series  for  each  country.  Thus,  we  continue  to  employ  the
assumption  that governments  have perfect  foresight  so  that  the variables
specified  on  the  RHS  of  equations  (E3.0) and  (E3.2)  are  treated  as
exogenous.  While the  residual  terms may  still  not  be  independently
distributed,  no  evidence  of  simultaneous equations  bias  was revealed  in  the
empirical  results.  Since,  the potential  for  heteroscedasticity  exists,  a
GLS procedure  was  chosen  where country population  over  world  population was
used  as  a weighting  factor.
Our  sample  includes  72  countries  over  the period  1967-80  of  which  70-13-
countries are  wheat  importers  and  56  are rice  importers.  Three  specific
data  problems  must  be  addressed  before  the  data  can  be  meaningful  pooled.
These are:  (1)  scale,  (2)  common  units  and  (3)  consistent  real  valuations.
Scale  problems  were handled  by  simply  defining  variables  in per  capita
terms.  Many of  the  variables are  initially defined  in local  currency
units.  A systematic  approach  to  converting  these  into  common  units  is
required.  This  is  particularly important  since  more than  one method  is
available.  The  most  common  technique  is  to  convert  the nominal  local
currency  values  into current  U.S.  dollars  through  the  current  exchange
rate.  However,  this  has  the problem  that  the new  value,  although  in common
units,  is now  a function  of  both  the  original  series  and  changes in
exchange rates.
Our  approach  is  to  convert  each series  into  real  valued  local  currency
units  first  and  then  apply  a fixed  base year  exchange  rate.  The  variations
will  now reflect  the underlying  changes in the  base  series  and  not  that  of
exchange rates.  Exchange rates  can  be brought  in as  a separate  variable.
The  exchange rate variable presents  particular  problems  for  pooled  data
analysis.  To  overcome this  problem, we convert  the  real  exchange rates
into  an  index  with a common  1973  base year.  Since  our  concern  is  with
import  behavior,  we  want  our  variables  to  reflect  as  much  as  possible real
rather  than  nominal  valuations.  The commodity  production,  consumption  and
trade  figures  are  thus  converted  to  wheat  equivalent  units  through  FAO
calorie conversions.  The  macro variables,  GNP and  total  exports  are
converted  first  into  real  local  currency values  through  the  use  of  GNP
price deflators  from the  World  Bank's  World  Tables  series  and  then-14-
converted  to constant  1973 U.S.  dollar  through  the use  of  the  1973  fixed
exchange rate.'
IV.  EMPIRICAL  ESTIMATION,  WHEAT  AND  RICE
The results  from fitting  (E3.0) to  data for  rice  and  wheat  appear  in
Table 1 and  Table 2.  The  results generally  adhere  to  prior  conditions of
excess  demand  functions.  The  sum  of  the mean  own  price  (-.510),  cross
price  (.071),  and  income  elasticity  (.435)  is  almost  zero in  the wheat
equation.  They  are  marginally negative  in the  rice equation.  The cross
price  elasticities of  the  two equations  are  surprisingly  close to  being
equal  (.071  and  .092, bottom of  tables  1 and  2).  The  most  significant
variable  in the  equations  is  per  capita  total  exports.  A one percent
increase  in per  capita exports  implies  an  approximate increase  for  both
wheat  and  rice  imports  of  almost  .44  percent.
In no  case,  is a coefficient  associated  with  the  rice  and  wheat  import
price variable  significant  at  less  than  the 99  percent  level.  In the  rice
case,  only the  base value  of  the  import  price elasticity  is  not
significantly  different  from  zero.  The  goodness of  fit,  measured  by  the
adjusted  R 2 , (.87  and  .83)  are reasonably  large  for  pooled  data results.
Several  alternatives  were available  for  estimating  the price
transmission  elasticities.  A pooled data  GLS estimate was carried  out
using  a varying  parameter  model  similar  to  that  used  for  import  equations,
but  of  a simplier  kind.  Only relative net  trade shares,  exchange rates,
and  the production-food  consumption  ratio were used  as  shifters  (Table 3).
The results  are encouraging.  The coefficients  are significant  at  the  one
percent  level  and  the adjusted  R2 exceeds  .99  for  both  wheat  and  rice.  The-15-
transmission elasticity for  wheat  is  more  than  twice  as  large as  the  rice
elasticity.  These results  need  to be  interpreted with  some caution
for  reasons mentioned  the  introduction  to this  paper.  These  departures from
our  framework  will  likely  give  rise  to lower  price transmission  elasticity
estimates  than  would otherwise  occur  and  hence  to  an  overestimate  of  excess
demand  elasticities.  Moreover,  the data  embody all  the  complexities  and
dynamics  of  an  economy  as  well  as  unknown measurement  deficiencies.  The
model  is  a fairly  simple,  partial  equilibrium  and  static  construct  which
focuses on  a narrow though  important dimension  of  government  intervention.
While this  level  of  abstraction has  it virtues,  is  is  not  surprising  that
the  interpretation  of  the empirical  results  is  not  entirely  without  some
ambiguity.  The  results  seem most  plausible  when  elasticities  are
interpreted  at  their  mean  values  over  the period  1967-1980.
To  obtain  insights  into  the  stability  of  the estimated  coefficients  of
these equations  the parameters  were reestimated  with  the  food  production-
consumption variable omitted.  The  results  for  the  price transmission
equations  only are  reported  in Table 4.  The change  in the  estimated
elasticities  and  other  equation  characteristics  were  minor.  The  price
transmission elasticity declined  somewhat, but  the  t-statistics  and
adjusted R2  remained  virtually  unchanged.
Since  the expected  price transmission  relationship  appears
straightforward,  equation  (E3.2)  was  fit  to  individual  country  as  opposed
to  pooled  data.  This had  the  advantage  of  reducing  cross-country  impacts
on  individual  price transmissions  estimates.  Even  under  this  procedure,
the  estimated mean  price transmission  elasticities  were  quite  close to  mean
values  reported  in Table 4.  The  wheat  elasticity  declined  somewhat  from  .512-16-
to  .458,  while  the rice  elasticity  increased  from  .201  to  .221.  Similar
small  changes  also  occurred  in  the  import  demand  equation.
The  direct import  elasticity for  wheat  compares favorably  with
those obtained  in  recent  studies  (8,12).  No  recent  studies  for  rice were
found  to compare with  the results  obtained  here.  Other studies  have  not
distinguished  between  import, price  transmission  and  excess  demand
elasticities,  and  hence  no comparison  is  posssible.
V.  ELASTICITY ESTIMATES:  IMPLICATIONS OF  THE  EMPIRICAL  RESULTS
The  implications  of  the  empirical  results are  discussed,  first,  on  the
basis of  their  mean  estimates  over  all  countries  for  the  period  1967-1980,
and  then  on  the  basis of  their  five  year  mean  estimates  for  the period  year
1967-1980.  Next,  the  estimated elasticities  are viewed  from a regional
basis  for  the period  1967-1980,  followed  by  the  relationship  of  the
elasticities  to  nominal  levels of  protection.
The direct  elasticities  of  import  demand  over  all  countries  for  the
entire  period  1967-1980 are  -.51  for  wheat  (Table 1) and -.66  for  rice
(Table 2).  The corresponding  price transmission  elasticities are  .51
and  .2 for  wheat  and  rice  respectively  (Table 3).  Hence,  the  implied
excess  demand  elasticities  are  approximately minus  one  for  wheat  and
approximately  -3.3  for  rice.  These  results  suggest  that  import  demand
elasticities  are  less  than  unity  and  that  these elasticities  are  less  than,
in absolute value,  their  corresponding excess  demand  elasticities.  The
results  are in general  agreement with  the  model  posited  which  leads to  the
conclusion that  over  all  countries  for  the 1967-1980  period,  government
intervention  in  markets  for  imported wheat  and  rice has  given  rise to  a
departure  of  direct  import  demand  elasticities from  their  corresponding-17-
excess  demand  elasticities;  and  the nature  of  this  intervention  has  served
to  isolate  domestic  markets  from variation  in border  market  prices.
The  results  obtained  for  variables  (NRCA,ER,PC) which  serve  to  reflect
country differences  in  the  direct  and  cross price  import  demand
elasticities,  also  support  the  conclusion  that  government  behavior  in
wheat markets  is  different  from  government  behavior  in rice  markets.
Moreover,  the  rice  economy,  on  average, appears  to  be  more  isolated  from
variation in border  prices than  in the  case  for  wheat.  These  results  seem
plausible  since,  given  the  relative magnitude  of  the  rice  and  wheat  excess
demand  elasticities, equal  variation  in rice  and  wheat  border  prices  will
induce a larger  per  capita  variation  in the rice  component  of  the applied
welfare measure  A.,  equation  (2.0'),  than  in its  wheat  component.  Hence,
governments appear  to  respond  by  isolating  rice relative  to  wheat markets.
This difference  in behavior  is  also suggested  when  the  pattern  of
elasticities are  viewed  over  time,  and  regions.
The coefficient  of  the  trade  shifter  variable associated  with  the
price of  wheat  in the wheat  equation  is  positive  (.375)  and  in the  rice
equation  the corresponding  coefficient  is  negative  (-.118).  These  results
suggest  in the  case of  wheat  that  as  a country's  relative net  import  share
in world  trade  (NRCA) of  wheat  increases,  the  direct  price  elasticity
increases  in absolute value  because  NRCA becomes a larger  negative  number;
in  the  case  of  rice,  the  sign  of  the corresponding  coefficient  is  negative
so  that  import  demand  elasticity decreases  in absolute  value  as  the
country's  relative net  import  share in world  rice  trade  increases.  Hence,
on  average,  rice  imports  become  less responsive  to  changes in their  border
price  as  a rice  importer's dependence  on  imports  increase,  while  wheat-18-
importers  become more responsive to  changes  in border  price  as  their
dependence on  wheat  imports  increase.
The coefficients  of  the  trade shifter  variable  is  positive  in the
price transmission  equations  for  both  wheat  and  rice.  Greater  relative
dependence on  trade in these commodities  tends to  decrease the price
transmission  elasticities.
The  coefficients of  the real  exchange rate  variable  associated with
wheat  price  in the wheat  import  demand  equation,  rice price  in the  rice
import  demand  equation  and  in  both  price transmission  equations  have,
universally,  negative signs.  A depreciation of  a country's  currency  in
real  terms  tends to  cause  rice  and  wheat  import  levels  to  be  more  sensitive
to  border  prices.  However,  the  results  from the  price transmission
equations  suggest  that  on  average a real  devaluation  of  a currency relative
to  the  dollar  yields less  responsiveness  of  changes  in domestic  prices to
changes  in border  market  prices,  i.e.,  while a nominal  depreciation  may
increase domestic  prices,  a depreciation  in real  terms tends  to  dampen
domestic  price changes relative  to  changes  in their  border  market
counterparts.
The  sign  of  the  coefficients associated  with  the  ratio of  food
production to  consumption  variable also differ  between  equations.  In the
case  of  wheat  (rice),  as  the  ratio  increases,  the  direct  price elasticity
increases  (decreases) in absolute value.  Results  from  the  price
transmission equations,  indicate  that  as  the ratio of  food  production to
consumption  increase, wheat  price becomes  more responsive to  changes in a
border  wheat  prices.  The reverse  occurs in the  case  of  rice.
Unfortunately, our  model  does not  provide any  insights  into  political-19-
behavior  so  that  no  rational  for  these  differences cannot be  inferred from
the  model.
We  now focus  on  the  patterns  of  elasticities  over  time,  regions,  and
level  of  protection.  There is  a very clear  time  trend underlying  the
elasticity  estimates  for  both wheat  and  rice  (Table 5).  The import  price
elasticity  and  the  excess  demand  elasticity  both  declined  significantly
over  the  period  1967-80  while  the  price transmission  elasticities tend  to
increase.
The  import  price elasticities  remain  less  than  one for  both wheat  and
rice  (and  declining)  over  the  entire  period.  This again  tends  to  support
the  notion  that  import  demand  is  inelastic.  However,  the  implied five  year
mean  excess demand  elasticities are  greater  than  one  for  wheat  through  1975
and  greater  than  one  for  rice over  the entire period.  Hence,  on  average,
government  intervention  is  characterized by  a "slower"  adjustment  of  import
levels  to  world  market  prices than  would  prevail  in the absence  of
intervention.
There  are  significant differences  in elasticities over  regions.  For
the case  of  wheat  (Table 5),  the  import  and  excess demand elasticities
increase  moving  from  Africa  south  of  Sahara,  to  Asia,  to  Latin America to
North  Africa.  The  price transmission  elasticity  is  largest  in Asia and
Latin  America.  The pattern  for  rice changes  somewhat from  that  of  wheat
(Figure 5).  Africa  south  of  Sahara  has  the  highest  excess demand
elasticity  and  the  lowest price  transmission elasticities.  Otherwise,  the
pattern  resembles  the  pattern  for  wheat.
A correspondence also seems  to  exist  between  the nominal  levels  of
protection and  import elasticities.  Wheat  import  and  excess demand-20-
elasticities clearly  tend  to decline  as  the  protection  coefficient
increases,  i.e.,  the  elasticites decline as  governments tax  their  food
surplus  producing  households  (Table 5) and  subsidize  food  deficit  producing
households.  This pattern  is  less  pronounced  in the  case of  rice,  but  none-
the-less the pattern  still  seems  to  hold.
There appears  to  less  correspondence between  the  price transmission
elasticity  and  the ratio  of  prices.  Although  this  is  somewhat  surprising,
there  is  no a priori  reason  for  price  levels  and  changes  to be
automatically  related.
VI.  CONCLUSION
It is  a stylized  fact  that  governments  intervene  in  their  foreign
trade  sectors.  The framework  utilized  to  model  import  behavior  which
explicitly  accounts for  government  intervention provides one basis  for
empirical  estimation of  elasticities.  The  model  posits  that  governments,
like  private  agents,  respond rationally  to  the  forces  they  face.  This
behavior  may result  in significant departures  from  the  import  behavior
characterized  by  free market  conditions.  In general,  import  elasticities
tend  to  be  substantially  lower  than  what  they would  otherwise  be.
Significant  insight  into  the  debate on  the  question  of  whether  import
elasticities are  elastic  or  inelastic  can  now be  made.  Excess demand
elasticities  for  both  wheat  and  rice  (rice  more  than  wheat)  tend  to be
elastic  supporting  the contention  of  Tweeten  and  Schuh.  However,  because
governments  intervene the  import  demand  elasticities  are inelastic.
Over  the period  studied  (1967-80),  there  was  a substantial  tendency
for  both  wheat  and  rice  import  and  excess  demand  elasticities  to fall.
This  was  associated with  increases  in  the price  transmission  elasticity-21-
implying  a tendency  over  time  to  permit  world  price  variation  to  be
reflected  in the  domestic  economy.  Regional  differences  were also
substantial.  Countries  with  lower  incomes  and  more  reliance  on  trade  for
their  consumption  (Africa south  of  Sahara),  tended  to have  lower  price  and
import  demand  elasticities.
An  important  explanatory  variable  of  import growth  was a country's
foreign  exchange earnings.  Obviously a country  with  growing  exports  can
afford  to  import while  one  with  stagnant  or  declining  exports  faces a
foreign  exchange  constraint.-22-
Table  1.  Pooled  Data Per  Capita Wheat  Import  Demand  Equation
Independent Variables  Coefficient  T-Statistic  Mean  Value
Intercept  4.461324  6.1806
Prod./Food  Consumption Shifter  1.097934  6.0557  .6719
Wheat  Import  Price Variable
Base Value  1.536104  3.4428  --
Trade  Share  Shifter  .374773  6.1284  -.5137
Exchange Rate Shifter  -.013254  -3.0311  101.5462
Prod./Consumption  Food  Shifter  -.755431  -4.3596  .6719
Rice  Import  Price  Cross Variable
Base Value  -1.739350  -4.1806
Trade Share  Shifter  -.398571  -7.3053  -.5137
Exchange Rate  Shifter  .010461  2.7158  101.5462
Prod./Food  Consumption  Shifter  .488835  2.9643  .6719
Feed Grain  Border  Price  -.267497  -4.9297  158.110
Oilseed  Border  Price  -.241467  -4.7693  223.007
Petroleum  Border  Price  .002557  3.3578  8.6607
Per  Capita Total  Real  Exports  .435372  16.7148  442.0603
Adjusted RSQ =  .8785
No.  of  Observations  =  980
Degree of  Freedom =  964
Standard  Error  of  the Estimate  = 24.785
Dependent Variable  = PER  CAPITA WHEAT  IMPORT  QUANTITY
Weighting  Factor = COUNTRY POPULATION/WORLD  POPULATION
Form  of  the equation--Log-log  with  varying  parameters  on  wheat  import  price
and  rice  import price.
Data Coverage--70  countries  over  1967-80.
Direct  Price elasticity  estimate  at  mean  variable  values =  -.50998
Cross  price elasticity  at  mean  variable  value =  .07094-23-
Table 2:  Pooled  Data  Per  Capita  Rice  Import  Demand  Equation
Independent  Variables  Coefficient  T-Statistic  Mean  Value
Intercept  5.364787  7.7011  --
Prod./Food  Consumption  Shifter  -1.955932  -4.1147  .8271
Rice  Import  Price  Variable
Base  Value  -.041256  -.1174
Trade Share Shifter  -.117753  -4.8347  -1.1307
Exchange  Rate  Shifter  -.012365  -3.6938  102.9551
Prod./Consumption  Food  Shifter  .629491  5.7877  .8271
Wheat  Import  Price Cross  Variable
Base  Value  -.725832  -1.8743
Trade Share Shifter  .070447  2.7888  -1.1307
Exchange Rate  Shifter  .011663  3.1510  102.9551
Prod./Food  Consumption  Shifter  -.366803  -3.6227  .8271
Feed  Grain  Border  Price  -.113700  -2.4451  162.9835
Oilseed  Border  Price  -.295057  -6.2329  222.6139
Petroleum  Border  Price  .004085  6.3319  8.6607
Per  Capita  Total  Real  Exports  .441707  14.4860  562.7990
Adjusted  RSQ  =
No.  of  Observations  =




Standard  Error  of  the  Estimate = 20.064
Dependent  Variable  = PER  CAPITA  RICE  IMPORT  QUANTITY
Weighting  Factor  = COUNTRY POPULATION/WORLD  POPULATION
Form  of  the  equation--Log-log  with  varying  parameters  on  rice  import  price
and  wheat  import  price.
Data Coverage--56  countries over  1967-80.
Direct  price  elasticity  estimate  at  mean  variable  values  =  -.66055
Cross price elasticity  estimate  at  mean  variable  values =  .091884-24-
Table  3:  Pooled  Data  Price  Transmission  Equation  Wheat  and  Rice
Independent  Variables  Coefficient  T-Statistic  Mean  Value
Intercept  (Wheat)  2.32567  22.1295
Wheat  Price Transmission  Variable
Base  Value  .600036  33.4129
Trade  Share Shifter  +.010620  +7.1947  -.5138
Exchange  Rate  Shifter  -,001038  -8.7063  101.5462
Prod./Consumption  Food  Shifter  .019759  5.0877  .6029
Intercept  (Rice)  4.08660  38.5104
Rice Price  Transmission  Variable
Base Value  .50209  26.8041
Trade  Share  Shifter  .00165  3.1214  -1.12837
Exchange  Rate  Shifter  -.00287  -22.4813  102.8368
Prod./Food  Consumption  Shifter  -.00482  -4.0842  .8292
Wheat  Rice
Adjusted  RSQ  =  .9921  .9927
No.  of  Observations  =  980  784
Degrees  of  Freedom  =  975  779
Standard  Error  of  the  Estimate = 8.235  9.402
Dependent Variable  = Log  of  Producer  Price  of  Wheat  and  Rice
Weighting  Factor  = COUNTRY POPULATION/WORLD  POPULATION
Form  of  the equation--Log-log  with  varying  parameters on  Pw  shifters
Data  Coverage--70 and  56 countries  over  1967-80.
Wheat  price elasticity estimates  at  mean  variable  values = .51244
Rice  price elasticity  estimates at  mean  variable  values = .2015-25-
Table  4:  Pooled  Data Price  Transmission  Equation  Wheat  and  Rice
Independent  Variables  Coefficient  T-Statistic  Mean  Value
Intercept  (Wheat)  2.32421  22.8390
Wheat  Price  Transmission  Variable
Base  Value  .600083  33.0212
Trade Share  Shifter  +.00996  +  6.6875  -.5138
Exchange  Rate  Shifter  -.00099  -8.2537  101.5462
Prod./Consumption  Food  Shifter
Intercept  (Rice)  4.1778  39.8543
Rice Price  Transmission  Variable
Base  Value  .48069  26.4639
Trade Share  Shifter  +.000783  +1.5995  -1.12837
Exchange Rate  Shifter  -.002912  -22.7010  102.8368
Prod./Food  Consumption  Shifter  - -
Wheat  Rice
Adjusted  RSQ  =  .9919  .9926
No.  of  Observations =  980  784
Degrees  of  Freedom =  976  780
Standard  Error  of  the Estimate  =  8.3395  9.4958
Dependent  Variable  =  Producer  Price  of  Wheat  and  Rice
Weighting  Factor = COUNTRY POPULATION/WORLD  POPULATION
Form  of  the equation--Log-log  with  varying  parameters  on  Pw  shifters
Data  Coverage--70 and  56 countries  over  1967-80.
Wheat  price elasticity  estimates  at  mean  variable  values  =  .50513
Rice  price elasticity  estimates  at  mean  variable  values =  .1803-26-
World Wheat and  Rice Import Demand, Price Transaission,  and Excess Demand Elasticities
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FOOTNOTES
SThe  approach  to  these derivations  can  be  found  in Orcutt  (1950).
The subscripts  I, D and  S  refer  to  import,  demand  and  supply while  the  ij
subscript  refers to  the  ith  commodity  in the  jth  country.  For  the
remainder  of  the  analysis  the  ij subscript  will  often  be  assumed  but  for
convenience  not written,  i.e.  read  Er  =  Enj.  Also there  is  an  implicit
time subscript  (t)  associated  with  each  variable.
2   Epij  =  (Pd  jaP,,,/PW  )/(P., j/Pdj),  where  PdIj  is
the  domestic price  of  the  ith  commodity in the  jth  country  and  P. is  the
respective  border  price.
3  In a multiperiod  model,  a positive  (negative) Treasury  position  can
be  viewed  as  a subsidy  (tax)  on  consumers  and  producers  in later  periods.
In a single  period  model,  it is  assumed  that  these concerns  are  embodied  in
the  utility  the  government obtains  from the  Treasury's position.
4  Of  the  72  countries,  70  imported  wheat  and  56  imported  rice.
Countries  with  zero  imports were  not  included  in the estimates.  Individual
estimates  for  each  country  would  be  ideal.  However,  sufficient  data to
estimate elasticities  for  a reasonably  large  set  of  individual  countries  is
very  limited.  With  appropriate  normalization of  variables,  the  pooling  of
cross-section  time series  data should  provide  the  best  overall  consistent
results  across  countries  provided  account  can  be  taken  of  individual
country  characteristics.
5 There  are,  of  course, numerous instruments  which  the  government  can
control.  These  include  domestic  consumer  and  producer  prices,  exchange
rates,  taxes,  tariffs  and  subsidies  of  various  kinds.  Moreover,  the
government  is almost  surely concerned  with  economic  activity in other
sectors.  The  solution  of  the  more general  problem requires  a general
equilibrium statement  of  the problem  which  would  unnecessarily  distract
from  the  focus  of  this  paper.  It can  be  shown,  however,  that  if taxes or
subsidies were  the  policy  instrument  rather  than  Qr,  the problem  can  be
redefined  within  this optimization  structre  so  that  the  choice  of  tax-
subsidy  level  will  yield  a Qr  level  identical  to  that  given  in equation
(3.0).  The  advantage  of  (3.0)  is  that  data  on  import  taxes  subsidies  is
generally  not  available.  Hence  the  use of  (3.0)  is  simply the  tax  or
subsidy  equivalent.
' In the  case of  linear  supply  and  demand  functions,  it is  easily
shown  that:  import  demand,  inverse  excess  demand  and  the price
transmission  equation  can  be expressed  as:
Gr  =  (k/(2X-a))(a'-b'Pw)
Pd  =  (a=-Qe)/b*,
and  Pd  =  (a-X)a*/b*a  +  (X/a)P.,  respectively  where  a*(which embodies  other price  and  income effects)  and  b* are parameters  and
2)-a t 0 is  assumed.  If  a > X,  then the  absolute  value  of  the  import
demand  elasticity  is  less than  the  excess demand  elasticity,  and  the price
transmission  elasticity is  less  than unity.  It  should  be  kept  in mind  that
the  weights X, a are,  in  general,  functions  of  A and  NR.
7  The  linear  univariate  model  is a special  case.  In  general  the
import  demand  function  will  shift  and rotate  with  changing utility  weights.
Note that  we make a clear distinction  between  the  import  demand  function
which  depends in part  on  government  preferences and  the excess  demand  which
reflects domestic  forces  of  demand  and  supply.  The distinction  between
these  has not  been brought  out in  the  literature.  Furthermore,  this
distinction clearly  separates  allocative interventions  which distribute  the
benefits  to  different  groups from  scale  intervention  which  serves to
separate the domestic and  international  markets.  For  the problem  of  import
demand,  it is  clearly the  later  which  is  most  important.  It  should  also be
kept  in mind  that  U(.)  contains  the  parameters  r(z)  which,  over  time,  may
vary  as a function  of  social  and  political  factors  (z).
e  See Appendix  for  definition.
9  A further  discussion of  data  sources  and  variable definitions  is
provided  in Appendix.
1o The  major  countries  with  large  average  NRCA.s  over  the  1967-1980
period  for  wheat  include  Bangladesh,  Chile,  Pakistan,  Peru,  Egypt,  Ethiopia
and  Brazil.  In the  case  of  rice,  the countries  are  Indonesia,  Sierra
Leone,  Sri  Lanka,  Bangladesh,  Senegal,  Tanzania, Malaysia  and  the  Ivory
Coast.-29-
APPENDIX  DATA  SOURCES  AND  VARIABLE  DEFINITIONS
1.  DATA SOURCES
The  data  for  the study  is derived  from the  following  sources:
International  Monetary  Fund,  International  Financial
Statistics  Data Tapes,  Washington,  D. C.,  1985.
World  Bank,  World  Tables  Tapes,  Washington,  D.  C.,  1984.
Food  and  Agricultural  Organization, Food  Balance  Sheet  Tape,  Rome,
1985, Production  Year  Book  Tape,  Rome  1985,  and  Trade  Yearbook  Tape,
Rome,  1985.
United  States  Census,  Population  Estimates,  1985.
2.  DATA DEFINITION
QOz, = Per  capita  import  quantity,  wheat  and  wheat  flour  and  rice  measured
in wheat equivalent  kilograms based  on  FAO  caloric  conversion,
from the  Food  Balance  Sheet  Tape,i  =  r, w. These  values are then
divided  by  country  Census  population estimates.
ERj  =  Real  exchange  rate  index  with  a 1973  dollar  base  in dollars;
Calculated  as  (XRit/XRi1 973 ) CPIus/CPI j.
XRjt  =  Exchange  rate  for  country  j, year  t.
XRj,1973 =  Exchange rate  for  country  j, 1973.
CPIue = Index  of  U.S.  consumer  prices,  1973  =  100.
CPIj  = Index  of  country j consumer  prices,  1973 =  100.
Pd9,J  =  Producer  price  series  taken  from  FAO;  Producer  Price  Tape,
aggregated  using  production  weights in wheat  equivalent  units  and
converted  to  U.S.  dollars  through  real  exchange  rate series  with  a
1973  base.
Pw,kj  =  International  price of  crude  oil  measured  in U.S.  dollars  per
barrel  times  the  real  exchange  rate index,  1973  base.-30-
Pe.J =  Per  capita  total  exports  of  goods and  nonfactor  services  converted
into  constant  1973  local  currency units and  then  transformed  into
U.S.  dollars  at  1973  exchange  rate base.
NRCAjs  =  Wheat  and  rice  net  revealed  competitive advantage  ratio,
i.e.,  revealed comparative  supply  (RCSIj) of  exports  of
wheat  or  rice  minus revealed  comparative  demand  (RCD 1j) of  imports
of  wheat  or  rice compared  with  total  agricultural  exports  and  imports
or:
(Xij/Xj)/(Xi/X) - (Mij/Mj)/(Mi/M)
where:  i =  commodity,  j =  country,  X =  exports,  M =
imports.-31-
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